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In this study, I investigated students’ memories of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, carried out by Al Qaeda terrorists against the World Trade Center in New York and
the Pentagon in Washington. Participants completed on two occasions (2 weeks and 8
months after the events took place) a memory questionnaire that included an assessment
of the phenomenal richness of their memories. The results showed that the participants
remembered very well the circumstances in which they first heard about the terrorist attacks,
that they were very confident about this information, and that these memories were
characterized by a high phenomenal richness. Over time, there was a decrease in all of
these variables, but people’s ratings of phenomenology and confidence were still very high.
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En este estudio se investigaron los recuerdos que tenían estudiantes de los ataques
terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001, llevados a cabo por terroristas de Al Qaeda
contra el World Trade Center en Nueva York y el Pentágono en Washington. En dos
ocasiones diferentes (2 semanas y 8 meses después de los sucesos) los participantes
rellenaron un cuestionario de memoria que incluía una evaluación de la riqueza
fenomenológica de sus recuerdos. Los resultados mostraron que los participantes
recordaban muy bien las circunstancias en las que se enteraron de los ataques terroristas,
que tenían mucha confianza en esta información, y que estos recuerdos se caracterizaban
por una gran riqueza fenomenológica. Con el paso del tiempo, había un decremento en
todas estas variables pero las valoraciones de las personas de la fenomenología y la
confianza se mantenían muy altas.
Palabras clave: recuerdos “flashbulb”, características fenomenológicas, confianza,
consistencia
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In a pioneer study, Brown and Kulik (1977) asked people
to recall the circumstances in which they first heard of
several surprising and impressive events that had taken place
between 10 and 30 years earlier (e.g., the death of President
John F. Kennedy). They found that most people were able
to provide vivid descriptions of these circumstances. Also,
some aspects of the circumstances appeared repeatedly in
the participants’ reports. These included: where the
participants were when they first heard the news, what they
were doing, who they were with, their own emotional
response, other people’s emotional responses, the source of
the news, and what they did after they heard the news. 
Brown and Kulik (1977) used the term “flashbulb
memories” to refer to these vivid memories. According to
the authors, flashbulb memories are vivid, detailed, and long-
lasting memories of the circumstances in which people first
learned about shocking public events. They also offered the
first theoretical explanation for the formation and maintenance
of such memories. They hypothesized that flashbulb
memories are caused by a special memory mechanism that
operates during encoding. They also stated that the kind of
events capable of producing flashbulb memories must be
new and unexpected, people must consider them important,
or the events must have consequences for them. Surprise and
consequentiality (which Brown and Kulik equated to
emotional arousal) were therefore necessary for the formation
of such memories. According to the authors, rehearsal
(whether overt—i.e., talking about the event—or covert—
i.e., thinking about it) also played an important role, as events
with a high degree of surprise and consequentiality would
be more frequently rehearsed. 
Since Brown and Kulik’s (1977) work, several studies
have tried to identify the encoding and rehearsal factors that
contribute to the formation of flashbulb memories. Among
these factors are the intensity of people’s emotional reactions
to the news (Bohannon, 1988; Bohannon & Symons, 1992;
Conway et al., 1994; Curci, Luminet, Finkenauer, & Gisle,
2001; Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Hornstein, Brown, &
Mulligan, 2003; Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 1984;
Schmolck, Buffalo, & Squire, 2000), surprise (Christianson,
1989; Cohen, Conway, & Maylor, 1994; Conway et al.,
1994; Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Finkenauer et al., 1998;
Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 1984), personal importance
(Conway et al., 1994), national importance (Conway et al.,
1994; Curci et al., 2001), and rehearsal (Bohannon, 1988;
Conway et al., 1994; Curci et al., 2001; Davidson & Glisky,
2002; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Rubin & Kozin, 1984). 
On the other hand, the involvement of a special memory
mechanism in the formation of flashbulb memories has been
much debated in the field. Some authors accept such a
mechanism (e.g., Pillemer, 1984) and consider flashbulb
memories as a distinct class of memories (Conway, 1995).
Others consider flashbulb memories to be the result of
ordinary memory processes (Christianson, 1989; Curci et
al., 2001; Finkenauer et al., 1998; McCloskey, Wible, &
Cohen, 1988; Neisser, 1982; Neisser & Harsch, 1992;
Neisser et al., 1996). Some of the latter authors stress the
importance of rehearsal processes in the formation and
maintenance of flashbulb memories (Neisser, 1982; Neisser
& Harsch, 1992; Neisser et al., 1996). According to these
authors, the high degree of emotionality of these memories
would prompt people to repeat the story. But, as rehearsal
is a reconstructive process, it would produce inaccuracies
in the participants’ report of these memories. Therefore,
flashbulb memories would not be formed by any special
mechanism. Furthermore, though extremely vivid and
recalled with a high degree of confidence, flashbulb
memories, like ordinary memories, would be inaccurate and
prone to reconstructive processes.
The debate about whether there is a special mechanism
for flashbulb memories has been linked to research about
the accuracy of such memories. Many studies that have tried
to clarify whether flashbulb memories are the result of a
special memory mechanism have focused on their pattern
of forgetting. This is because of Brown and Kulik’s
description of flashbulb memories as “photographic pictures.”
Although these authors never used the word “accuracy” in
their paper, it has often been assumed that if a special
memory mechanism is involved in the formation of flashbulb
memories, these should be highly accurate and immune to
forgetting (Conway, 1995). 
In most studies, accuracy has been defined as the degree
of consistency between memories reported shortly after the
event and several months or years later. The level of
consistency obtained in these studies has been very variable
(see Winningham, Hyman, & Dinnel, 2000, for a review):
Some authors have found high levels of consistency
(Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Cohen et al., 1994; Conway
et al., 1994; Hornstein et al., 2003; Pillemer, 1984) while
others have reported that, even in flashbulb memories, there
is a general loss of specific detailed information over time
(Christianson, 1989; Christianson & Engelberg, 1999; Curci
et al., 2001; Schmolck et al., 2000) and that there may be
considerable inconsistency between people’s recollections
at test and retest (McCloskey et al., 1988; Neisser & Harsch,
1992). Such a loss of information over time is accompanied
by a decrease in people’s confidence about their recollections
(Christianson, 1989). Concerning this discrepancy,
Christianson pointed out that not all the information
contained in flashbulb memories has to follow the same
pattern of forgetting. Therefore, he suggested that some core
information present in flashbulb memories is less vulnerable
to forgetting, whereas other detailed information is more
vulnerable to forgetting over time. Although most studies
in the field have not included questions about these two
types of information, a recent work of Schmidt (2004) has
obtained evidence supporting Christianson’s suggestion.
In addition, studies testing the consistency between test
and retest have not usually focused on memory for the
emotional reaction experienced when one first heard of an
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event. Exceptions are some studies that have obtained mixed
results. Christianson and Engelberg (1999) found little
consistency over time in people’s self-estimations of their
emotional reaction. Similarly, Fivush, Edwards, and Mennuti-
Washburn (2003) reported that people tend to underestimate
the intensity of their emotional reaction when they heard
about a highly negative event. Conversely, Curci et al. (2001)
found that, on those occasions, people remember the
emotions experienced quite well. 
On the other hand, Brown and Kulik (1977) pointed out
that one of the most distinctive characteristics of flashbulb
memories was that some perceptual and other details of the
reception context come to mind with great vividness and
clarity. This rich phenomenology might contribute to the high
level of confidence that people have in their flashbulb
memories, even in cases in which they have been shown to
be inaccurate. In fact, some authors have pointed out that the
main characteristic of flashbulb memories is not their accuracy,
but rather the high degree of confidence participants have in
them (Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Nevertheless, the high
phenomenal richness of these memories is a common
assumption in flashbulb memory research that has scarcely
been tested. There are, however, few studies that have assessed
some aspects of flashbulb memories’ phenomenal
characteristics, such as their overall vividness (Kvavilashvili,
Mirani, Schlagman, & Kornbrot, 2003; Neisser & Harsch,
1992; Pillemer, 1984; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Wright,
Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh, 1998), or the amount of visual
details (Nachson & Zelig, 2003; Pillemer, 1984) and other
sensory details (Pillemer, 1984) they contain. There is a more
detailed way to investigate qualitative characteristics of
memories that comes from the literature on source monitoring,
the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) developed
by Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988). Although it
has never been applied to flashbulb memory research, it is
beginning to be used by researchers in autobiographical
memory. For example, using the MCQ, D’Argembeau,
Comblain, and Van der Linden (2003) and Schaefer and
Philippot (2005) have reported that emotional autobiographical
memories (especially positive ones) are more richly recollected
(they contain more sensorial and contextual information) than
are neutral memories. If emotional memories are more detailed
than neutral ones, we should expect the same pattern of results
with flashbulb memories, as they are associated with high
levels of emotionality. Thus, the MCQ might be a very useful
tool, as it would allow testing with great detail sensorial and
contextual characteristics of flashbulb memories.
On September 11, 2001, a series of terrorist attacks
shocked almost everyone across the United States and around
the world. These events were clearly very appropriate for
research in flashbulb memories, as they were surprising,
shocking, and probably submitted to a considerable amount
of rehearsal. In fact, several studies about flashbulb memories
for the September 11th terrorist attacks have recently appeared
(Budson et al., 2004; Lee & Brown, 2003; Luminet et al.,
2004; Niedzwienska, 2004; Pezdek, 2003; Schmidt, 2004;
Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Tekcan,
Ece, Gülgoz, & Er, 2003). The present study was also intended
to investigate flashbulb memories of the circumstances in
which people first heard about the atrocities carried out by
Al Qaeda terrorists against the World Trade Center in New
York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001. 
The first aim of the study was to assess the consistency
of flashbulb memories over time by collecting data shortly
after the 9-11 terrorist attacks took place and 8 months later.
If there is a special mechanism involved in the formation
of flashbulb memories, one should expect memories of the
circumstances in which participants first heard of those
events to be very consistent. But, as suggested by
Christianson (1989), there might be a different pattern of
forgetting for core information and peripheral details. I was
interested on testing the consistency of these two kinds of
information. With this aim, and following the distinction
between central and peripheral features employed by Schmidt
(2004), I considered as core information the information
that could not be omitted without changing the nature of
the event (for example, the place where people were when
they first heard the news), whereas peripheral details were
those that did not fulfill such a condition (for example, what
clothes they were wearing). In addition, I wanted to assess
the consistency of people’s memories of their emotional
reaction when they first heard the news.
A second, and more innovative, aim of this study was
to obtain a detailed profile of the phenomenal traits of
flashbulb memories. As reviewed in the introduction, this
aspect has scarcely been assessed by researchers. I was also
interested in testing whether there is a loss of such
phenomenal traits over time. If flashbulb memories are a
special kind of memories, one might expect them to have
a high richness of phenomenal details and that this richness
is maintained over time. If this were the case, the rich
phenomenology might contribute to the high level of
confidence that people have in flashbulb memories, even if
they are inaccurate.
Method
Design
Memory for the circumstances relating to the 9-11 atrocities
was tested two times. The first one, two weeks after the events
took place, and the second one, 8 months later. Memory was
tested with a questionnaire specially designed for this study.
It was modeled on those used by Conway et al. (1994), Curci
et al. (2001), and Finkenauer et al. (1998) but it also included
an additional set of items intended to assess the phenomenal
characteristics of participants’ memories. These items were
part of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire elaborated
by Johnson et al. (1988). 
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Participants
Thirty-two first year Psychology students participated
in the study as a course requirement. Their ages ranged from
18 to 37 years (M = 20.11, SD = 2.99). They had no
knowledge about the topic of flashbulb memories. 
Measures
The test and retest questionnaires were identical. They
comprised several sets of questions, which I shall now describe. 
Phenomenal characteristics. Participants assessed the
phenomenal characteristics of their autobiographical
memories of the circumstances in which they first heard
about the events. They rated their memories on some of the
scales included in the MCQ. Thus, on a 7-point scale (1 =
not at all, 7 = very much), they rated whether their memory
of these circumstances was clear, whether it was in color,
and whether it contained visual details, sounds, smells, tastes,
and tactile sensations. They also rated the degree of vividness
and detail of their memory, as well as the ease with which
they remembered the circumstances in which they first heard
about the events. An average score was calculated for the
phenomenal characteristics of participants’ memories.
Reception context or flashbulb memory attributes. This
set consisted of specific questions about the circumstances
in which participants heard the news. They were asked about
five aspects of the reception context that, following the
Schmidt (2004) criterion, I considered core information: the
exact time when they heard the news (date, day of the week,
and hour), where they were, what they were doing, who they
were with, and what was their source of information. In
addition, they were asked about some other detail or peripheral
information: what they were wearing, what was their first
thought, and what was their activity after hearing the news.
For all questions, participants received a score of 1 when
they were able to remember the answer and a score of 0
when they were not. For the question about the date of the
event, participants received a score of 2 when their answer
included all the information they were asked for. When
either the date, the day of the week, or the hour was missing,
they scored 1, and when no answer was provided they scored
0. A core score was calculated by averaging the scores of
the five main questions. A peripheral score was computed
by averaging the scores of the three remaining questions.
In addition, for all the questions, participants rated the degree
of confidence about their recollection on a 7-point scale (1
= not at all sure; 7 = completely sure). 
Consistency between answers to test and retest was also
calculated for all the above questions. The scoring procedure
used was modeled on that used by Conway et al. (1994):
For each item, responses at the first data collection and at
retest were compared. A score of 2 was given if subjects
provided exactly the same answer each time, whereas a score
of 1 was given when some information was missing or when
information changed between test and retest. Finally, a 0
score was given if the answers were totally different or if
they were missing at retest. Thus, an average consistency
score was computed for both core and peripheral information. 
Encoding and rehearsal variables. Participants answered
a series of questions about their emotional reactions to the
events. On a 7-point scale (1 = no reaction at all; 7 = a
very intense reaction), they had to rate the intensity of their
emotional reaction when they first heard the news. Also, on
a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), they rated
the degree to which they experienced the following emotions:
anger, sadness, fury, guilt, fear, anxiety, rebelliousness,
disgust, shame, and worry.
Participants also rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all;
7 = very much) the extent to which they considered the
events to be surprising, the extent to which they thought the
events could have consequences for themselves, for Spain,
and for the world. On a 7-point scale (1 = never, 7 = more
than 10 times), they also rated how often they had followed
the news on TV, on the radio, and in the newspapers and
how many times they had had spontaneous thoughts,
memories or images about the events since they took place. 
Procedure
Two weeks after the 9-11 attacks, participants were given
the initial questionnaire. They were not told about any future
retest. Eight months later, they were given the same
questionnaire to retest their memories. Both questionnaires
were answered during a classroom session. A short
introduction to the questionnaires indicated that there were
no right or wrong answers to any question and that the study
was concerned with memory for impacting events.
Results
Questionnaire scores obtained at test, mean consistency
values between test and retest for the reception context
questions, and participants’ confidence ratings are shown in
Table 1. The data show that core information was better
remembered than peripheral details, t(31) = 2.6, p < .05,
and that participants were more confident about their
responses to the core questions than to the peripheral ones,
t(22) = 3.2, p < .01. Furthermore, as can be seen from the
table, the degree of consistency was not the same for all the
questions. In particular, the highest consistency ratings were
for the questions included in the core information category,
whereas those belonging to the peripheral category showed
a lower consistency level, t(23) = 6.2, p < .001. Confidence
ratings also decreased for some of the questions between
test and retest. In particular, there was a significant decrease
in participants’ confidence about their memory for time,
t(31) = 3.3, p < .005, place, t(30) = 3.2, p < .005, other
people present. t(31) = 2.5, p < .05, their activity after
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hearing the news, t(28) = 4.1, p < .001, and their first
thought, t(31) = 3.7, p < .005. In addition, when I analyzed
participants’ confidence about their memories for core and
peripheral information, I observed that, in both cases, there
was a decrease between test and retest, t(31) = 3.7, p < .005
and t(31) = 4.7, p < .001, respectively. However, the decrease
in confidence was larger for peripheral details than for core
information, t(16) = –2.6, p < .05.
The phenomenal and emotional characteristics of
memories reported at test and retest are shown in Table 2.
Concerning the first test, a repeated measures ANOVA
showed that there were differences between the different
phenomenal characteristics assessed, F(9, 23) = 109.6, p <
.001. In particular, memories’ clarity and the ease with which
people remembered the circumstances in which they first
heard about the events received the highest scores. A further
repeated measures ANOVA showed that there were
differences between the ratings of the different emotions,
F(9, 23) = 40.9, p < .001. As can be seen from the table,
worry was the most intensely experienced emotion.
Table 1
Participants’ Mean Responses at Test and Retest: Reception Context and Confidence
Variables Test scores Confidence Consistency scores Confidence
Time 1.8 (0.1) 6.5 (0.1) 1.6 (0.1) 5.7 (0.3)
Place 1.0 (0.0) 6.9 (0.1) 1.8 (0.1) 6.4 (0.1)
Ongoing activity 1.0 (0.0) 6.8 (0.1) 1.6 (0.1) 6.4 (0.2)
Other people present 1.0 (0.0) 6.9 (0.1) 1.6 (0.1) 6.6 (0.1)
Source 1.0 (0.0) 6.8 (0.1) 1.8 (0.1) 6.6 (0.1)
Clothes 0.7 (0.1) 4.9 (0.4) 1.2 (0.2) 4.5 (0.4)
First thought 1.0 (0.0) 6.3 (0.2) 0.8 (0.2) 5.0 (0.3)
Activity after hearing the news 0.9 (0.0) 6.8 (0.1) 1.3 (0.2) 5.7 (0.2)
Core information 1.0 (0.0) 6.8 (0.0) 1.7 (0.0) 6.4 (0.1)
Peripheral information 0.9 (0.0) 5.9 (0.2) 1.1 (0.1) 5.1 (0.2)
Note. Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.
Table 2
Means of Phenomenal Ratings and Emotional Ratings at Test and Retest
Variables Test Retest
Phenomenal traits (average score) 4.6 (0.1) 4.3 (0.2)
Clarity 6.6 (0.1) 5.6 (0.2)
Colors 5.9 (0.2) 5.8 (0.2)
Visual details 6.0 (0.2) 5.6 (0.2)
Sounds 4.6 (0.3) 4.1 (0.3)
Smells 1.5 (0.2) 1.8 (0.2)
Tastes 1.6 (0.2) 2.0 (0.3)
Tactile sensations 2.2 (0.3) 2.4 (0.3)
Vividness 6.0 (0.2) 0.9 (0.2)
Detail 5.6 (0.2) 4.8 (0.3)
Ease in remembering 6.6 (0.1) 5.5 (0.3)
Intensity of emotional reaction 5.5 (0.2) 5.5 (0.2)
Anger 3.1 (0.3) 3.7 (0.3)
Sadness 5.7 (0.2) 5.1 (0.3)
Fury 4.2 (0.4) 4.4 (0.3)
Guilt 1.2 (0.1) 1.5 (0.2)
Fear 3.9 (0.4) 4.1 (0.4)
Anxiety 4.0 (0.4) 3.7 (0.3)
Rebelliousness 2.5 (0.3) 2.9 (0.3)
Disgust 2.3 (0.4) 2.8 (0.4)
Shame 1.5 (0.2) 1.6 (0.2)
Worry 6.3 (0.2) 5.8 (0.2)
Note. Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.
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I performed t-tests to analyze differences between test
and retest ratings. These tests showed that there were
significant differences in clarity of memories, t(31) = 4.5,
p < .001, the degree of memories’ visual detail, t(31) = 4.8,
p < .001, ease in remembering, t(31) = 4.3, p < .001, the
detail of participants’ memories, t(31) = 3.5, p < .005, and
their vividness, t(31) = 4.8, p < .001. Furthermore, there
was a significant difference in the average score for the
phenomenal characteristics of participants’ memories, t(31)
= 3.1, p < .005. With regard to emotional intensity, the scores
at test and retest were identical. Concerning the specific
emotions, the only significant differences between test and
retest appeared for anger, t(30) = –2.3, p < .05, sadness t(31)
= 2.6, p < .05, and worry, t(31) = 3.3, p < .005. 
Finally, I performed several Pearson correlations between
the encoding and rehearsal variables, the participants’
memories phenomenal characteristics, and the reception
context variables. The most relevant correlations were the
following: The average score for the phenomenal traits of
participants’ memories correlated with the intensity of their
emotional reaction, r = .55, p < .005, with the degree of
surprise of the events, r = .50, p < .005, with the extent to
which they could have consequences for the participants, r
= .51, p < .005, for Spain, r = .53, p < .005, and for the
world, r = .51, p < .005, and with the frequency with which
participants had followed the news on TV, r = .40, p < .05.
The intensity of participants’ emotional reaction correlated
with the extent to which the events could have consequences
for themselves, r = .50, p < .005, for Spain r = .44, p < .05,
and for the world, r = .65, p < .001, with the extent to which
they were surprising, r = .37, p < .05, and with the extent
to which participants talked about the feelings related to the
events, r = .36, p < .05. Furthermore, there was a significant
correlation between the extent to which the events were
surprising and how often participants had followed the news
on TV, r = .39, p < .05, how many times they had had
spontaneous thoughts about the events, r = .37, p < .05, the
extent to which they had talked about the reception context,
r = .44, p < .05, and the extent to which the events could
have consequences for the world, r = .39, p < .05. However,
I failed to obtain any significant correlation between
reception context measures and any of the encoding and
rehearsal variables. I did not observe either any significant
correlation between participants’ confidence in their
memories, the phenomenal characteristics of these memories,
and their test-retest consistency.
Discussion
In this study, I examined people’s memories of the
circumstances in which they first heard about the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. I also examined the
phenomenal traits of these memories and the degree of
confidence that participants had in them. In addition, I tested
the consistency of these memories over time. The results
show that participants were able to remember a lot of
information about the reception context of the 9-11 terrorist
attacks, they were very confident about this information,
and that these memories were characterized by a high
phenomenal richness. Over time, there was a general loss
of information and a decrease in participants’ confidence in
their recollections that affected peripheral details more than
core information. Furthermore, there was a reduction in the
phenomenal richness of participants’ memories. In spite of
this decrease, people’s recollections of the September 11th
terrorist attacks at retest were still very rich and participants
continued to be very confident about them. Finally, 8 months
after the events took place, participants remembered very
well the intensity of their emotional reactions when they
first heard about the news.
As stated at the end of the introduction, the most
innovative aim of the present study was to obtain a detailed
profile of the phenomenal characteristics of memories for
highly emotional and unexpected events. To my knowledge,
this study is the first one in this field of research that has
tested flashbulb memories’ phenomenology in such a detailed
way. These results show that flashbulb memories contain a
high richness of phenomenal details and that they are
especially characterized by their clarity and the ease in
remembering them. Furthermore, although the circumstances
in which participants heard about the September 11th terrorist
attacks were more richly recollected at the first test than at
retest, participants’ memories retained a high degree of
sensorial details and continued to be easy to remember 8
months after the events took place. These findings are in the
same line of some previous studies that have reported that
flashbulb memories are vividly recollected (e.g., Kvavilashvili
et al., 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Wright et al. (1998),
however, did not obtain high levels of vividness in their
study. This last result might be due to the fact that the authors
assessed vividness of the memories, which, according to my
results, is not the most distinctive trait of flashbulb memories.
Furthermore, they interviewed participants a long time after
the events took place (19 and 38 months). In fact, as we
have just seen, my own findings show that there is some
decrease in flashbulb memories’ phenomenal traits over time. 
On the other hand, these results concerning flashbulb
memories’ phenomenal traits are in agreement with previous
work that has shown that emotional memories are more
richly recollected than neutral ones (D’Argembeau et al.,
2003; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005). Whereas in these studies,
this superiority has been especially obtained with positive
events, my results show that it can also be observed with
negative events, when they produce a high emotional
reaction. It could be that the lack of effects with negative
information in previous studies was due to the fact that they
had not a high degree of emotional intensity. 
The test-retest methodology has also allowed me to
assess whether participants remember accurately the intensity
of their feelings when the events took place. This is a topic
scarcely addressed in research about flashbulb memories. I
observed that people remember quite well the intensity of
their emotional reactions to a shocking and impressive event.
These results are in agreement with those of Curci et al.
(2001) but contrast with the findings of Fivush et al. (2003),
who observed that people did not accurately recall the
intensity of their feelings when they first heard about the
9-11 terrorist attacks. These contradictory data could be
explained, from my point of view, by methodological
reasons, such as the procedure employed to assess
emotionality: Fivush et al. used a global measure of
emotional stress, whereas the present study and the one by
Curci et al. included assessments of global emotional
intensity as well as of different types of emotions.
Concerning memories of the reception context, the
present findings show that not all the items were equally
remembered, since there was superiority in memory for core
information over peripheral information. This superiority
was also evident in participants’ confidence. Moreover, the
differences between core and peripheral information were
maintained over time, since my data show that, although
there was a general loss of information in the 8 months
elapsed between test and retest, the degree of consistency
of memories for core information was greater than for
peripheral information. The same was true for participants’
confidence in their recollections. From my point of view,
these findings suggest that the distinction between core and
peripheral information proposed by Christianson (1989) is
a relevant one. It might be that previous discrepancies
between studies assessing flashbulb memories’ consistency
over time could be explained by the reception context
variables tested. My results clearly suggest that flashbulb
memories contain some information that, although thought
vulnerable to the passage of time, is more resistant to
forgetting than other details that are initially included in
participants’ reports of the circumstances in which they first
heard about the news. This higher resistance to forgetting
is accompanied by a greater confidence.
However, it has to be taken into account that, even in
the case of core information, I failed to obtain a perfect
consistency between test and retest. This result is in
agreement with previous flashbulb memory research that
has reported an overall loss of information over time
(Christianson, 1989; Christianson & Engelberg, 1999; Curci
et al., 2001; Lee & Brown, 2003; McCloskey et al., 1988;
Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Schmidt, 2004; Schmolk et al.,
2000; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Tekcan et al., 2003). In
addition, the finding that peripheral details seem to be
submitted to a higher forgetting rate over time than is core
information is in the same line as the two previous studies
that have assessed consistency for central and peripheral
information in flashbulb memories (Christianson, 1989;
Schmidt, 2004). According to Schmidt, these results would
suggest that flashbulb memories are not like photographs.
Rather, people would retain schematic information about
the circumstances in which they heard about the news, but
their memories for peripheral details would be poor. 
My data with respect to memories of the reception
context of shocking and impressive events as well as those
concerning the phenomenal characteristics of these memories
suggest that they are not immune to forgetting and that, with
the passage of time, they undergo some loss of their
phenomenal richness. These findings could be considered
as evidence against the involvement of a special mechanism
in the formation of flashbulb memories. However, it has to
be taken into account that, in spite of these decreases,
people’s ratings of phenomenology and confidence were
still very high and that there are some aspects of the
reception context that were very well remembered 8 months
after the events took place. Moreover, there is a limitation
in the present study that precludes the establishment of clear
conclusions about the special status of flashbulb memories:
I did not include a control event. If I had assessed
participants’ memories of some other autobiographical event
and had compared them with their memories of the
September 11th terrorist attacks, I could arrive at stronger
conclusions. Without such a control, my data have to be
considered descriptive.
Finally, I would like to point out that several authors
have tried to identify the encoding and rehearsal factors that
contribute to the formation of flashbulb memories. These
variables are the intensity of people’s emotional reactions to
the news (Bohannon, 1988; Bohannon & Symons, 1992;
Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway et al., 1994; Curci et al.,
2001; Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Hornstein et al., 2003;
Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Schmolk et al., 2000),
the extent to which the news was surprising (Christianson,
1989; Cohen et al., 1994; Conway et al., 1994; Davidson &
Glisky, 2002; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Pillemer, 1984; Rubin
& Kozin, 1984) and submitted to rehearsal (Bohannon, 1988;
Conway et al., 1994; Curci et al., 2001; Davidson & Glisky,
2002; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Hornstein et al., 2003; Rubin
& Kozin, 1984), as well as the degree of personal and
national importance of the event (Conway et al., 1994; Curci
et al., 2001). The correlational analyses performed failed to
show any significant relationship between any of these
variables and participants’ memories of the reception context.
I did not obtain either any significant correlation between
the memories’ phenomenal traits, their test-retest consistency,
and the degree of confidence that participants had in their
memories. In my opinion, the failure to obtain more relevant
correlations could be due to the low number of participants
in this study. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that I
have obtained a relevant pattern of relationships: My data
show that there is a correlation between the degree of surprise
of the events, the intensity of the emotional reaction they
provoked, their consequentiality, the extent to which they
were submitted to some kind of rehearsal, and the degree of
phenomenal richness of memories of the circumstances in
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which people first heard about the events. These results
suggest that there is a clear relationship between some of
the traits that characterize flashbulb memories, such as that
they are rich in phenomenal details and that they are produced
by surprising, emotionally arousing, consequential, and
rehearsed events.
To sum up, these results suggests that the September 11th
terrorist attacks produced an intense emotional reaction also
in people from countries other than the United States, such
as Spain, that they were surprising, consequential, and
submitted to an important degree of rehearsal. People had
detailed and phenomenally rich memories of the circumstances
in which they first heard about the terrorist attacks. However,
these memories were not immune to forgetting as there was
a decrease in information, in phenomenal details, and in
people’s confidence over time. Further research, including
larger samples of participants, should be addressed to compare
the rate of forgetting and the phenomenal traits of memories
of impressive and shocking events with those of more ordinary
autobiographical events.
References
Bohannon, J.N. (1988). Flashbulb memories for the space shuttle
disaster: A tale of two theories. Cognition, 29, 179-196.
Bohannon, J.N., & Symons, V.L. (1992). Flashbulb memories:
Confidence, consistency, and quantity. In E. Winograd & U.
Neisser (Eds.), Affect and accuracy in recall: Studies of
‘flashbulb memories’ (pp. 69-94). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Brown, R., & Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulb memories. Cognition, 5,
73-99.
Budson, A.E., Simons, J.S., Sullivan, A.L., Beier, J.S., Solomon,
P.R., Scinto, L.F., Daffner, K.R., & Schacter, D.L. (2004).
Memory and emotions for the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks in patients with Alzheimer’s disease, patients with mild
cognitive impairment, and healthy older adults. Neuropsychology,
18, 315-327.
Christianson, S.A. (1989). Flashbulb memories: Special, but not
so special. Memory & Cognition, 17, 435-443.
Christianson, S.A., & Engelberg, E. (1999). Memory and emotional
consistency: The MS Estonia ferry disaster. Memory, 7, 471-
482.
Cohen, G., Conway, M.A., & Maylor, E.A. (1994). Flashbulb
memories in older adults. Psychology and Aging, 9, 454-463.
Conway, M.A. (1995). Flashbulb memories. Hove, UK: Erlbaum.
Conway, M.A., Anderson, S.J., Larsen, S.F., Donnelly, C.M.,
McDaniel, M.A., McClelland, A.G.R., Rawles, R.E., & Logie,
R.H. (1994). The formation of flashbulb memories. Memory
& Cognition, 22, 326-343.
Curci, A., Luminet, O., Finkenauer, C., & Gisle, L. (2001).
Flashbulb memories in social groups: A comparative test-retest
study of the memory of French President Mitterrand’s death
in a French and a Belgian group. Memory, 9, 81-101.
Davidson, P.S.R., & Glisky, E.L. (2002). Is flashbulb memory a
special instance of source memory? Evidence from older adults.
Memory, 10, 99-111.
D’Argembeau, A., Comblain, C., & Van der Linden, M. (2003).
Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for
positive, negative, and neutral events. Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 17, 281-294.
Finkenauer, C., Luminet, O., Gisle, L., El-Ahmadi, A., Van der
Linden, M., & Philippot, P. (1998). Flashbulb memories and the
underlying mechanisms of their formation: Toward an emotional-
integrative model. Memory & Cognition, 26, 516-531.
Fivush, R., Edwards, V.J., & Mennuti-Washburn, J. (2003).
Narratives of 9/11: Relations among personal involvement,
narrative content and memory of the emotional impact over
time. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 1099-1111.
Hornstein, S.L., Brown, A.S., & Mulligan, N.W. (2003). Long-
term flashbulb memory for learning of Princess Diana’s death.
Memory, 11, 293-306.
Johnson, M.K., Foley, M.A., Suengas, A.G., & Raye, C.L. (1988).
Phenomenal characteristics of memories for perceived and
imagined autobiographical events. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 117, 371-376.
Kvavilashvili, L., Mirani, J., Schlagman, S., & Kornbrot, D.E.
(2003). Comparing flashbulb memories of September 11 and
the death of Princess Diana: Effects of time delays and
nationality. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 1017-1031.
Lee, P.J., & Brown, N.R. (2003). Delay related changes in personal
memories for September 11, 2001. Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 17, 1007-1015.
Luminet, O., Curci, A., Marsh, E.J., Wessel, I., Constantin, C., Gencoz,
F., & Yogo, M. (2004). The cognitive, emotional, and social
impacts of the September 11 attacks: Group differences in memory
for the reception context and the determinants of flashbulb
memory. The Journal of General Psychology, 13, 197-224.
McCloskey, M., Wible, C.G., & Cohen, N.J. (1988). Is there a
special flashbulb memory mechanism? Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 117, 171-181.
Nachson, I., & Zelig, A. (2003). Flashbulb and factual memories:
The case of Rabin’s assassination. Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 17, 519-531.
Neisser, U. (1982). Snapshots or benchmarks? In U. Neisser (Ed.),
Memory observed (pp. 43-48). San Francisco: Freeman.
Neisser, U., & Harsch, N. (1992). Phantom flashbulbs: False
recollections of hearing the news about Challenger. In E.
Winograd & U. Neisser (Eds.), Affect and accuracy in recall:
Studies of ”flashbulb memories” (pp. 9-31). New York:
Cambridge University Press
Neisser, U., Winograd, E., Bergman, E.T., Schreiber, C.A., Palmer,
S.E., & Weldon, M.S. (1996). Remembering the earthquake:
Direct experience vs. hearing the news. Memory, 4, 337-357.
Niedzwienska, A. (2004). Metamemory knowledge and the accuracy
of flashbulb memories. Memory, 12, 603-613.
Pezdek, K. (2003). Event memory and autobiographical memory
for the events of September 11, 2001. Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 17, 1033-1045.
CONSISTENCY AND PHENOMENAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FLASHBULB MEMORIES 59
Pillemer, D.B. (1984). Flashbulb memories of the assassination
attempt on President Reagan. Cognition, 16, 63-80.
Rubin, D.C., & Kozin, M. (1984). Vivid memories. Cognition, 16,
81-95.
Schaefer, A., & Philippot, P. (2005). Selective effects of emotion
on the phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical
memories. Memory, 13, 148-160.
Schmidt, S.R. (2004). Autobiographical memories for the September
11th attacks: Reconstructive errors and emotional impairment
of memory. Memory and Cognition, 32, 443-454.
Schmolck, H., Buffalo, E.A., & Squire, L.R. (2000). Memory distortions
develop over time: Recollections of the O.J. Simpson trial verdict
after 15 and 32 months. Psychological Science, 11, 39-45.
Smith, M.C., Bibi, U., & Sheard, E. (2003). Evidence for the
differential impact of time and emotion on personal and event
memories for September 11, 2001. Applied Cognitive Psychology,
17, 1047-1055.
Talarico, J.M., & Rubin, D.C. (2003). Confidence, not consistency,
characterizes flashbulb memories. Psychological Science, 14,
455-461.
Tekcan, A.I., Ece, B., Gülgöz, S., & Er, N. (2003). Autobiographical
and event memory for 9/11: Changes across one year. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 17, 1057-1066.
Winningham, R.G., Hyman, I.E., & Dinnel, D.L. (2000). Flashbulb
memories? The effects of when the initial memory report was
obtained. Memory, 8, 209-216.
Wright, D., Gaskell, G.D., & O’Muircheartaigh, C. (1998).
Flashbulb memory assumptions: Using national surveys to
explore cognitive phenomena. British Journal of Psychology,
89, 103-122.
Received, May, 24, 2005
Review received, July, 22, 2005
Accepted September 15, 2005
FERRÉ60
